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Introduction 
The financial and economic crisis has hit Europe in its core. While the crisis may not have 
originated in the European Union, it has laid bare structural weaknesses in the EU’s policy 
framework. Both public finances and the banking sector have been heavily affected. For a long 
time, the EU failed to take into account sufficiently the perverse link that existed between the 
two. Negative evolutions in one field of the crisis often dragged along the other in its 
downward spiral. 
In June 2012, in the early hours of a yet another EU Summit, the leaders of the eurozone finally 
decided to address the link between the banking and sovereign debt crises. Faced with soaring 
public borrowing costs in Spain and Italy, they decided to allow for the direct European 
recapitalisation of banks when the Member State itself would no longer be in a position to do 
so. In exchange, supervision of the banking sector would be lifted to the European level by 
means of a Single Supervisory Mechanism. 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism, or SSM in the EU jargon, is a first step in the broader 
revision of policies towards banks in Europe. The eventual goal is the creation of a Banking 
Union, which is to carry out effective surveillance and – if needed – crisis management of the 
banking sector. The SSM is to rely on national supervisors and the ECB, with the ECB having 
final authority on the matter. The involvement of the latter made it clear that the SSM would 
be centred on the eurozone – while it is to remain open to other Member States willing to join.  
Due to the ongoing problems and the link between the creation of the SSM and the 
recapitalisation of banks, the SSM became one of the key legislative priorities of the EU. In 
December 2012, Member States reached an agreement on the design of the SSM. After 
discussions with the European Parliament (which were still ongoing at the time of writing), the 
process towards making the SSM operational can be initiated. The goal is to have the SSM fully 
up and running in the first half of 2014. 
The decisions that were taken in June 2012 are likely to have had a bigger impact than the 
eurozone’s Heads of State and Government could have realised at the time for two important 
reasons. On the one hand, creating the SSM necessitates a full Banking Union and therefore 
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shared risk.  On the other hand, the decisions improved the ECB’s perception of the willingness 
of governments to take far-reaching measures. This undoubtedly played a significant role in the 
creation of the Outright Monetary Transactions programme by the ECB, which has led to a 
substantial easing of the crisis in the short-term.
1
 These short-term gains should now be 
matched with a stable long-term framework for bank supervision and crisis management. The 
agreement on the SSM should be the first step in the direction of this goal. 
This paper provides an analysis of the SSM and its role in the creation of a Banking Union. The 
paper starts with a reminder of why the EU decided to put in place the SSM (§1) and the state 
of play of the ongoing negotiations on the SSM (§2). Subsequently, the supervisory 
responsibilities of the SSM are detailed, including its scope and the division of labour between 
the national supervisors and the ECB (§3). The internal functioning of the SSM (§4) and its 
relation to the other supervisors are discussed afterwards (§5). 
As mentioned earlier, the SSM is part of a wider move towards a Banking Union. Therefore, this 
paper sheds light on the other building blocks of this ambitious project (§6). The transition 
towards the Banking Union is important and will prove to be a bumpy ride. Before formulating 
a number of conclusions, this Working Paper therefore provides an overview of the planned 
road ahead (§7). 
  
                                                 
1 See: VANDEN BOSCH, X., 2012, Preventing the rise of sovereign borrowing costs in the eurozone: 
what can the ESM and the ECB achieve? Egmont Paper 56. 
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1. The Reasons for Creating a Single Supervisory Mechanism 
While there are many sound long-term arguments for creating a European supervisor, the 
creation of the SSM is clearly linked to the ongoing crisis. The hope is that the SSM, as part of 
the move towards a Banking Union, can lessen the short-term problems experienced in Europe. 
The main aim is to break the “vicious circle” between the bank and sovereign debt crises. 
Indeed, this link has been evident on several occasions during the crisis. 
On the one side, the problems in the banking sector have had severe repercussions on public 
finances. Problems in the banking sector brought along an economic crisis, which led to high 
deficits (due to less revenue for and more spending by the government). In addition, the 
weakened banks bought fewer government bonds of those countries whose solvability was put 
into question (e.g. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). To make matters worse, several 
governments had to use public money to prevent banks collapsing (in a disorderly fashion). In 
the cases of Ireland and Spain, the government was not able to provide the money for such 
interventions. These countries had to request European assistance as a result. 
Problems in public finances, on the other side, also had a negative impact on the banking 
sector. Governments’ measures to reduce their deficits hit economic growth, which in turn hit 
the already weakened profitability of banks. Furthermore, as some countries’ capacity to 
reimburse their debts was questioned, the market value of their debt decreased. Banks that 
held such debt saw the value of their financial buffers decrease as a consequence. In the case 
of Greece, it was not only the market value that decreased. Due to the Greek public debt 
“haircut”, banks had to take heavy real losses. 
For the banks in countries that were perceived as potentially insolvent, an additional problem 
arose. As investors doubted whether these countries would be able to rescue a bank, the 
perceived solvability of the banks located in their territories deteriorated as well. This resulted 
in higher interest rates charged to these banks as they borrowed on money markets. This in 
turn caused the solvency of the country to be questioned even more, increasing again the 
borrowing costs of banks.
2
 
Eurozone leaders sought to stop this self-reinforcing negative feedback loop by more direct 
European intervention in the banking sector. First of all, European supervision was to remove 
fears of investors and fellow Member States that national supervisors were not being honest 
about the scale of the problems in their banking sectors. Secondly, the possibility of direct 
European recapitalisation of banks would improve the perceived solvency of the Member States 
themselves. 
There are indeed reasons to believe that European supervision will be of higher quality than 
supervision on the national level. National supervisors have, on occasion, tended to hide 
national problems and protect their national champions. A European supervisor should exercise 
more neutral supervision and, furthermore, improve the supervision of banks operating across 
national borders. National supervision appeared to be increasingly out of line with the reality 
                                                 
2 ELLIOTT, D., 2012, Key Issues on European Banking Union: Trade-Offs and some Recommendations. 
Brookings, Global Economy & Development, Working Paper 52; and ECB, 2012, Financial Stability 
Review. 
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of a transnational industry.
3
 While these are sound arguments, it is not a certainty that having 
a European supervisor would lead to better supervision. The European supervisor will face its 
own set of challenges.
4
 Therefore, beyond the level at which it is carried out, the quality of 
supervision is pivotal. For this reason, the design of the SSM is of essential importance. 
2. The Legislative State of Play of the SSM Proposal 
The commitment of eurozone leaders to creating a SSM in June 2012 was followed up in 
September of that year by a legislative proposal by the European Commission.  The proposal 
consisted of two pieces of legislation. Firstly, a Regulation was proposed to set up the SSM 
itself.
5
 This Regulation is based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(TFEU), which specifies that the approval of the Regulation requires unanimity among the 
Member States in the Council. 
The second legislative proposal was a Regulation that aims to modify voting rights in the 
European Banking Authority (EBA), the main EU-wide body dealing with the supervision of 
individual banks (see 5.).
6
 This second Regulation is to be adopted by the normal legislative 
procedure of the EU, which implies an agreement between the Council and the European 
Parliament. 
The European Parliament has linked the approval of both pieces of legislations together. 
Besides its role in approving the Regulation on the EBA, the European Parliament has gained a 
substantial voice in negotiations on the Regulation on the SSM as well. 
In December 2012, the Council reached an agreement on both legislative acts.
7
 This has been 
followed by discussions with the European Parliament on their final content. In March 2013, 
negotiations between the two EU institutions were still ongoing. In discussing the SSM, the 
paper is therefore based on the Council’s agreement of December 2012. The final outcome of 
the SSM is likely to differ from the agreement that was reached in certain aspects, although 
the overall design of the SSM will remain unaltered. Where possible, this Working Paper 
indicates where discussions with the Parliament can modify aspects of the SSM. 
                                                 
3 BONNEAU, T., Mécanisme de surveillance unique et Union bancaire. In: La Semaine juridique 
entreprise et affaires 2012, v. 86, n. 43, 25 October. 
4 ALLEN, F., CARLETTI, E. & GIMBER, A., 2012, The financial implications of a banking union. In: 
BECK, T. (ed.), Banking Union for Europe: Risks and Challenges. Centre for Economic and Policy 
Research. 
5 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a Regulation conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. 12 
September 2012, COM(2012) 511. 
6 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) [...]. 12 September 
2012, COM(2012) 512. 
7 COUNCIL OF THE EU, Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) [...], 14 December 
2012, EF 317 [hereinafter: Council Agreement on the EBA]; and COUNCIL OF THE EU, Proposal for a 
Regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions, 14 December 2012, EF 316. [hereinafter: Council 
Agreement] 
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3. The SSM’s Supervisory Competences 
Supervision has traditionally been a national competence, with only limited cross-border 
cooperation taking place.
8
 The SSM will change this approach by lifting a substantial part of 
supervisory responsibilities to the European level. 
The SSM will result in a landmark change in the way financial institutions are supervised in the 
EU. However, it will not lift all financial supervisory responsibilities to the European level. It is 
therefore important to understand the limits of the SSM’s supervisory scope (3.1). Even inside 
the SSM, there is a division of labour between the national and the European level, leaving a 
substantial part of the supervisory tasks at the national level (3.2). 
3.1. Limits to the scope of the SSM’s competences 
The scope of the SSM’s supervisory competences is essentially limited in three ways: 
geographically, in terms of the coverage of the financial sector, and with regard to the tasks it 
executes. Each of these limits is discussed below. 
3.1.1. Only participating Member States 
The SSM will not become the EU supervisor. It will encompass only some of the EU Member 
States. Its precise scope remains unclear, however, as that depends on the willingness of 
Member States to join the SSM. 
Member States inside the eurozone do not have a choice. For them, membership of the SSM is 
obligatory. This modifies the nature of eurozone membership, as it now involves not only an 
Economic Union and a Monetary Union, but also a Banking Union. In the past, economists had 
already pointed to the fact that the financial sector was closely linked to the currency union.
9
 
In contrast to the eurozone countries, Member States outside the eurozone are free to join the 
SSM. The differentiation between eurozone and non-eurozone countries is due to both a lack 
political will in some non-eurozone countries to join the SSM, and legal constraints that limit 
the voice of non-eurozone countries in the SSM (see 4.2). It is not yet clear which non-eurozone 
Member States will join the SSM. Some of them have made it clear that they will not join the 
SSM - notably the UK and Sweden. Other countries have shown willingness to join the SSM, 
depending, of course, on the final outcome of the legislative negotiations. 
Different scenarios of SSM membership are conceivable. In an inclusive scenario, participation 
in the SSM could reach 24 or 25 Member States. In a more selective scenario, the eurozone 
countries and perhaps one or two other Member States would join the SSM. This would limit the 
number of participating Member States (hereinafter SSM-countries) to 20 at most. Even in such 
a selective scenario, the SSM encompasses a large majority of the EU’s Member States. 
 
                                                 
8 For an overview of the situation after the last reform of EU supervision, see: VERHELST, S., 2011, 
Renewed Financial Supervision in Europe – Final or transitory? Egmont Paper 44. 
9 See for example: BEGG, D., DE GRAUWE, P. (et al.), 1998, The ECB: Safe at Any Speed? Monitoring 
the European Central Bank. Centre for Economic and Policy Research. 
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3.1.2. Only banks 
As a second element limiting its scope, the SSM will not cover the financial sector at large. It 
will deal with only part of the sector, i.e. credit institutions (and, where relevant, their parent 
companies). A credit institution is defined by EU legislation as: “an undertaking whose business 
is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own 
account”.10 In this paper, the term “bank” is used for all credit institutions that meet this 
definition. 
The EU definition of banks covers only part of the financial sector. For example, it does not 
include investment firms.  Such firms are active parts of the financial sector, and perform 
many of the same tasks as traditional banks. Yet, as they do not receive deposits from the 
public, they are not defined as banks by European law. In contrast, some Member States, e.g. 
France, do define investment firms as banks. For the SSM, however, only the European 
definition is relevant. 
Numerous other types of financial institutions also fall outside the scope of the EU’s definition 
of a bank. This includes: insurance firms, hedge funds, pensions funds, central counterparties 
dealing with securities and derivatives, brokers-dealers and asset managers. These types of 
financial institutions will continue to be supervised at the national level. 
At one point EU institutions tried to enlarge the Banking Union discussion a discussion on a 
“Financial Union”, which would encompass a larger part of the financial sector.11 Despite these 
attempts the project has remained focused on the banking sector in narrow terms. This will 
result in some odd situations. The insurance arm of a financial institution will be supervised at 
the national level, while the banking arm of the same institution will be supervised as part of 
the SSM. The differentiated level at which supervision takes place will require close supervisory 
cooperation between the different supervisors. 
3.1.3. “Non-essential” supervisory tasks remain national  
The SSM Regulation endows the ECB with specific supervisory competences only (see infra). As 
a consequence, the national supervisors continue to carry out all supervisory functions that are 
not transferred to the ECB. These tasks can be seen as “non-essential”, in the sense of being 
not strictly necessary to ensure the stability of the financial sector. 
These “non-essential” tasks include, inter alia, the following12: 
 Supervising banks based in countries outside the EU operating in the Member State by 
cross-border activity or a branch, i.e. not having a separate legal entity in the 
country. This seems the main exception to the SSM’s competences in supervising banks 
                                                 
10 See Art 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC. Credit institutions also include “electronic money 
institutions”.  
11 See VAN ROMPUY, H., 2012, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. 26 June 2012; and 
BARNIER, M., 2012, Towards a European financial union and a more solid European banking sector. 
Speech at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 12 July. 
12 See Recital 22 of Council Agreement of December 2012. The Recital also mentions day-to-day 
supervision as a competence that should remain at the national level. Yet, it seems that national 
supervisors will in some cases carry out these functions on behalf of the ECB – the latter thus having 
financial supervisory authority in the matter. 
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in the SSM. It implies that non-EU banks would be supervised nationally, despite the 
problems they might provoke. As the Icelandic bank Icesave has shown, this is far from 
a theoretical risk.
13
 For consumers it is difficult to distinguish between non-EU banks 
having a separate legal entity in the country and non-EU banks that do not. 
 Verifying a bank that seeks to set up a separate legal entity (i.e. establish itself) in 
the Member State. This serves to verify whether the bank meets the relevant national 
legislation. Afterwards, the ECB can still decide not to give an authorisation to a bank 
(see infra). 
 Supervision of banks in relation to markets in financial instruments (investment 
services).
14
 The supervision of markets in financial instruments is seen as different from 
the surveillance of banks’ operations as such. Thus, this competence is left at the 
national level. 
 Macro-prudential powers. If financial stability is believed to be at risk, the national 
supervisor can impose higher capital buffers on their banks. The ECB has similar 
powers. The fact that both the national supervisor and the ECB can impose capital 
buffers independently of each other does not necessarily need to be problematic. Yet, 
it clouds supervisory responsibilities. Which supervisor will/should be blamed if capital 
buffers are not increased when this ought to be the case? 
 Prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing.  
 Consumer protection 
These last two tasks can be seen as linked to financial supervision for safeguarding financial 
stability, but not essential to it. In any case, it requires other supervisory competences than 
the competences needed to monitor financial stability. The SSM regulation therefore leaves 
these competences on the national level. 
3.2. Supervision in the SSM 
Within the limits outlined above, the ECB will become the responsible supervisor for the 
banking sector. The ECB’s supervisory tasks are limited to those expressly mentioned in the SSM 
Regulation – nonetheless resulting in a vast set of tasks (3.2.1). However, the ECB will not carry 
out all of these supervisory functions itself. It will only supervise those banks directly which are 
deemed “significant” (3.2.1). For the banks thought to be “less significant”, supervision will be 
delegated to the national supervisors – while the ECB will retain final supervisory authority  
(3.2.3).  
Oddly enough, the SSM has not been properly defined in the relevant regulation. The regulation 
only states that the SSM is “composed of the ECB and national competent authorities [i.e. 
national supervisors]”.15 As a consequence, it is unclear whether the competences for which 
the national level retains final authority are a part of the SSM. In this paper, we view those 
competences as outside the scope of the SSM. Figure 1 situates the SSM in the EU’s financial 
supervision landscape, based on the limits to the SSM’s scope mentioned above and the division 
of labour discussed below. 
                                                 
13 See for example: IMF, 2012, Iceland: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access Under the 2008 
Stand-by Arrangement. IMF Country Report No. 12/91, April. 
14 See MiFID, Directive 2004/39/EC; and the Commission Proposals COM(2011) 652 and COM(2011) 
656. 
15 Article 5(1) of the Council Agreement. 
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Figure 1: The place of the SSM in the EU’s financial supervision landscape 
 
3.2.1. The SSM’s supervisory tasks 
The European Treaties allow conferring only specific supervisory tasks onto the ECB.
16
 
Therefore, the SSM Regulation defines a precise list of supervisory tasks that are to be carried 
out by the ECB. The list mentioned in the Regulation is extensive and concerns the essential 
components of bank supervision. The ECB’s tasks notably cover: 
 Supervision of compliance with EU law, including national law that transposes EU 
legislation. This constitutes the core of bank supervision. It notably includes monitoring 
the liquidity and solvency (i.e. the financial health) of banks. 
 Carrying out “host supervision” of banks operating in the SSM, but established in an EU 
Member State that does not participate in the SSM. The role of a host supervisor is 
limited, and essentially concerns the supervision of liquidity provisions and reporting 
requirements by the bank. 
 Supervising the governance arrangements in banks. Since the financial crisis, 
governance arrangements have become more important. They cover a wide range of 
issues, including risk management, bonus policies and the selection of management 
staff; 
 Supervision on a consolidated basis of (mixed) holding companies and complementary 
supervision of financial conglomerates. When a bank is part of a larger structure, 
especially one involved in other financial sectors, the ECB is to carry out supervision at 
the level of that larger structure, in as far as this is relevant for bank supervision. 
 Preparing for crisis situations. This includes periodic stress tests, supervision of 
recovery plans (living wills) and carrying out early crisis intervention if needed (see 
6.2). By endowing the ECB with early intervention powers, the legislators interpret the 
Treaty rules broadly. The Treaty Article used for the SSM Regulation allows endowing 
the ECB with prudential supervisory tasks, not crisis management. Early intervention is 
situated on the borderline between supervision and crisis management. The ECB is thus 
                                                 
16 Article 127(6) TFEU. 
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not allowed to venture much further into crisis management, at least not on the basis 
of the Treaty Article used for supervision. 
 Authorising banks and withdrawing bank authorisations. Banks that request an 
authorisation to operate in the SSM will require the authorisation of both the national 
supervisor (see supra) and the ECB. The ECB can withdraw a bank authorisation if it 
finds that a bank does not respect the EU rules. Withdrawing a bank authorisation is an 
essential competence for a supervisor, as it renders the supervisor credible (it 
constitutes a last resort sanction). Revoking a bank’s authorisation implies the 
resolution of the bank, which can be costly. If bank resolution remains at the national 
level, this will result in disputes between the ECB and the Member State. Therefore, 
further steps in European crisis management and bank resolution are needed (6.2). 
 Macro-prudential powers. These macro-prudential powers are similar to the national 
supervisors’ macro-prudential powers (see supra).  
 Assessing mergers and acquisitions of banks. Beyond the traditional rules of 
competition, specific assessments are performed for banks (e.g. financial soundness 
and reputation). The ECB will have the final say in these assessments, although the 
national supervisor is to prepare the assessment. 
 Participation in supervisory colleges. Supervisory colleges are to stimulate cross-
border cooperation between supervisors. The ECB will gain a seat in these colleges (see 
5.1). 
The tasks mentioned above appear to cover the key tasks of bank supervisors.
17
 Yet, problems 
may arise if the SSM-countries wish to endow the ECB with additional supervisory competences 
after the SSM Regulation has been adopted. Endowing the SSM with further competences is 
possible only if all EU Member States (including the non-SSM countries) agree to it. This is a 
cumbersome procedure, hampering the SSM’s ability to adapt to changed circumstances. Yet, it 
is unavoidable in the current legal setting.
18
 
3.2.2. “Significant” banks: direct supervision by the ECB 
Determining whether or not a bank is “significant” is inherently a subjective matter. Even so, it 
is of the utmost importance in the division of labour in the SSM between the ECB and the 
national supervisors. Only those banks that are believed to be “significant” will be supervised 
directly by the ECB. In its Agreement, the Council has identified specific thresholds. Under the 
Council Agreement, a bank is deemed “significant” when it meets at least one of 5 criteria: 
1. The value of the bank’s assets exceeds € 30 billion. This criterion is to ensure that 
the largest banks in the SSM-countries are supervised directly by the ECB. 
2. The value of the bank’s assets exceeds € 5 billion and 20% of the GDP of the 
Member State in which it is located. Due to the 20% of GDP requirement, this criterion 
only applies to SSM-countries with a GDP of less than € 150 billion.19 In the eurozone, 
these smaller SSM-countries are:  Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and 
                                                 
17 WYMEERSCH, E., 2012, The European Banking Union, a First Analysis. Ghent University, Financial 
Law Institute, Working Paper 2012-07. 
18 Competences would have to be transferred to the ECB using the same article on which the SSM is 
based, i.e. Article 127(6)TFEU, which requires unanimity. 
19 For countries with a GDP level that exceeds 150 billion, 20% of GDP exceeds € 30 billion. Banks in 
those countries would already be covered by the € 30 billion criterion. 
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Slovenia. The criterion would be relevant for most non-eurozone countries that join the 
SSM, with the exception of the two largest non-eurozone economies, i.e. Poland and 
the Czech Republic. The “at least € 5 billion” requirement excludes the smallest banks 
of the smallest Member States (in the eurozone, these are Cyprus, Estonia and Malta), 
which are believed not to be of systemic importance.
20
 
3. A bank is among the three most significant banks of a participating country. The 
criterion “significant” was not defined in the Council’s December Agreement. While the 
value of assets and cross-border activity seem the most relevant criteria, the precise 
criteria will have to be defined in more detail. This criterion does not apply when 
justified by “particular circumstances”, which most likely refers to the bank’s limited 
size. 
4. A bank has large cross-border activities. In that case, the ECB can decide to supervise 
a bank centrally. The Council’s Agreement has left it to the ECB to provide a precise 
methodology for this criterion.
21
 
5. A bank receives assistance from a eurozone bailout fund. A bank that has requested 
or already receives direct financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) or the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) will automatically be put under 
ECB supervision. This criterion does not concern banks that receive indirect financial 
assistance by the EFSF/ESM via the Member State, i.e. as part of a financial assistance 
programme for the Member State’s government. 
These 5 criteria take into account different considerations. Criteria 1 and 4 both focus on the 
importance of a bank on the European level, while criteria 2 and 3 refer to a bank‘s relative 
importance to the SSM-country in which it is located. The final criterion is to be seen in light of 
the European taxpayers’ money that is at stake. 
The ECB is expected to supervise only about 150 banks directly. While this is a fraction of the 
more than 6000 banks in the eurozone, these banks represent approximately 80% of bank 
assets.
22
 
It is possible that the specific values proposed by the Council will be altered in the final 
compromise with the European Parliament, but the main criteria will most likely remain 
unaltered. A major question that remains unresolved in the Council Agreement is whether the 
thresholds will be periodically adjusted to inflation. As it currently stands, this appears not to 
be the case. As a consequence, over time an increasing number of banks would fall under 
direct ECB supervision. 
Beyond these specific criteria, the ECB can decide at any time to supervise a specific bank 
directly. It can take this decision after a request of the Member State or on its own initiative.
23
 
The possibility for the ECB to take charge of the supervision of a bank is a pivotal element in 
the credibility of the SSM. Without such a provision, the ECB would not have been able to 
exercise its final supervisory authority. Yet, the ECB will have to dare to use its powers to claw 
back the delegation of supervision when it has doubts regarding the national supervisor’s 
                                                 
20 When a country’s GDP exceeds € 25 billion, 20% of its GDP is by definition more than € 5 billion. 
21 Article 5(4) of Council Agreement 
22 IMF, 2013, A Banking Union for the Euro Area. 
23 Article 5(5) of Council Agreement 
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actions. This will not be an easy choice as it will likely result in market unrest, but it is 
nonetheless essential to make the SSM function properly. 
3.2.3.  “Less significant” banks: national supervision on behalf of the ECB 
Banks that do not meet one of the 5 requirements mentioned above are labelled “less 
significant”. About 98% of banks in the eurozone fall under this definition. They continue to be 
supervised at the national level. While these banks represent only about a fifth of the banking 
sector in terms of assets, it is clear that most supervisory operations in the SSM will still be 
carried out nationally.
24
 
As mentioned above, even for banks that are supervised on the national level, the ECB still has 
final supervisory responsibility within the framework of the SSM. This will require a good 
working relationship between the national supervisors and the ECB. It will be challenging for 
the ECB to monitor national supervisors effectively. Detailing reporting requirements is an 
essential part of this task, but is not in itself sufficient. The ECB will have to determine when 
and to what extent it interferes with national supervision. If not properly managed, its 
decentralised functioning could prove to be the SSM’s weak spot.25 
4. The SSM’s Organisational Structure 
In order for the SSM to be able to exercise its supervisory role, the proper organisational 
provisions need to be in place. A major factor is the decision-making structure in the ECB with 
regard to supervisory matters, within the EU’s legal limits (4.1). These legal limits also have an 
impact on the different natures of the non-eurozone countries’ membership of the SSM 
compared to eurozone countries’ membership (4.2). Choosing the ECB as the responsible 
supervisor furthermore required special arrangements to prevent an entanglement of its 
supervisory and monetary tasks (4.3), and to ensure the ECB’s accountability for its supervisory 
policy (4.4). 
4.1. Supervisory decision-making in the ECB 
The EU Treaties provide clear rules on decision-making in the ECB. These rules are designed 
with the ECB’s monetary tasks in mind. As a result, only the eurozone countries have a say in 
the ultimate decision-making body of the ECB, the Governing Council. This, of course, 
conflicted with the desire to include non-eurozone countries in the SSM. In an effort to balance 
legal requirements and the need for inclusive decision-making, a procedure had to be devised 
that respects the Treaty’s wording while nonetheless making non-eurozone SSM-countries equal 
partners in decision-making, to the extent possible. 
4.1.1. The general procedure 
Decision-making on supervisory matters in the SSM centres around two ECB bodies: a) the 
Supervisory Board, mainly composed of national supervisors, and b) the Governing Council, the 
ECB’s ultimate decision-making body. 
                                                 
24 IMF, 2013, A Banking Union for the Euro Area. 
25 BABIS, V., FERRAN, E., 2013, The European Single Supervisory Mechanism. Working Paper, 
University of Cambridge. 
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Under the procedure that is foreseen, the Supervisory Board drafts the ECB’s supervisory 
decisions. Subsequently, the decision is formally adopted by the Governing Council. A draft 
decision by the Supervisory Board is deemed adopted by the Governing Council, unless the 
latter objects to that decision within less than ten working days.
26
 This procedure resembles 
the “reversed Qualified Majority Voting” that is used for a number of economic governance 
decisions in the Council of Ministers.
27
 
The Governing Council is the only body that can block a decision by the Supervisory Board. Yet, 
it will do so only very infrequently. Under normal circumstances, this makes the Supervisory 
Board the de facto decision-making body. 
Figure 2: Supervisory decision-making in the ECB 
 
Besides the Supervisory Board and the Governing Council, two specific bodies are to deal with 
supervisory decision-making in the ECB: the Mediation Panel and the Panel of Review. These 
two bodies can enter into play when a dispute arises on a supervisory decision. Figure 2 
provides an overview of the four decision-making bodies. Their composition and functioning are 
discussed below. 
4.1.2. The bodies involved in decision-making 
Supervisory Board 
As mentioned previously, the Supervisory Board is to act as the de-facto decision-making body. 
Providing the body with this role allows all SSM members to have a say in the supervisory 
decisions made by the ECB. The voting members of the supervisory board are: 
 Chair. The chairperson is a full-time professional, which prevents the person from 
exercising other functions on the national, European or international level. Under the 
Council Agreement, he/she is elected by the Council of Ministers. The European 
Parliament will undoubtedly try to get a substantial say in this nomination. 
 Vice-chair. He/she is selected from among the members of the ECB’s Executive 
Board.
28
  
                                                 
26 This can be less in case of particular urgency. 
27 Under Reversed Qualified Majority Voting, the Commission make a proposal to the Council. That 
proposal is subsequently deemed adopted, unless the Council objects to that decision by a qualified 
majority within a limited timeframe (often 10 working days). 
28 This will most likely be the Vice-President of the ECB Executive Board, Vítor Constâncio. 
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 Four ECB Representatives. These representatives are appointed by the ECB’s Governing 
Council and are not allowed to perform functions linked to monetary policy. 
 A representative of each SSM-country’s national supervisor. If the central bank is not 
the national supervisor, the central bank may nonetheless be present at meetings. In 
terms of voting, the two representatives of the same Member State would then be 
“considered as one member”. The precise meaning of the latter remains unsure. It 
could imply that each of the two representatives gets half the votes allocated to the 
country. It could also imply that the representatives have to vote in the same manner. 
In addition to these members with voting rights, the European Commission acts as a non-voting 
observer in the Supervisory Board. 
A rather complex voting system in the Supervisory Board has emerged from the legislative 
negotiations. In principle, decisions in the Supervisory Board are made by a simple majority of 
the members. In case voting ends in a draw, the Chair’s vote is decisive. 
ECB regulations that are adopted to apply Union law form an exception to this general rule. 
These regulations will play an important role in streamlining supervisory practices. Such 
regulations are decided by qualified majority voting (QMV), giving more clout to the bigger 
Member States. In this case, each of the four ECB representatives will represent the median 
votes of the other members. The Regulation does not provide for voting rights for the Chair and 
Vice-Chair in case of QMV. Until the end of 2015, however, both a simple majority and a 
qualified majority are needed to adopt such decisions. 
Governing Council 
The Governing Council’s role in supervisory decision will most often be limited, as it can only 
intervene to block a decision of the Supervisory Board. In exceptional cases, the Governing 
Council could make use of this possibility. This makes the composition and voting rights of the 
Governing Council most relevant. 
The composition of the Governing Council is as follows: 
 The governors of each of the national central banks of the eurozone. 
 The members of the ECB Executive Board. The Executive Board is responsible for the 
ECB’s operational matters. It has six members (including the President and Vice-
President of the ECB), all of whom are appointed by the eurozone Heads of State or 
Government. 
Only some of the Member States and public bodies that are involved in bank supervision in the 
SSM are members of the Governing Council. First and foremost, this concerns non-eurozone 
SSM-countries. In addition, in SSM-countries in which bank supervision is not carried out by the 
central bank, the national supervisors also do not figure among the Governing Council’s 
members. Hence, these two categories do not have an automatic right to a seat at the table in 
meetings of the Governing Council. Yet, the ECB’s Rules of Procedure allow inviting external 
persons when this is deemed necessary. Other relevant parties can therefore participate in the 
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meetings of the Governing Council.
29
 As a result, the exclusiveness of the Governing Council is 
not to be seen in terms of presence at the meetings, but in respect of the right to vote. 
The problem of voting rights in the Governing Council stretches beyond the lack of voting rights 
for non-eurozone members. As long as the eurozone does not exceed 18 member countries, 
each member of the Governing Council has the right to vote. As each member of the Governing 
Council has one vote, voting powers are irrespective of the economic size or population of a 
Member State. Yet, when the eurozone will have more than 18 members, national central bank 
governors will have to alternate their voting rights. Therefore, not all eurozone countries will 
vote in the Governing Council. At any given time, only 15 central bank governors will have 
voting rights in the Governing Council. Bigger eurozone countries, in terms of GDP, will more 
frequently have voting rights than their smaller counterparts, which gives bigger countries a 
bigger say.
30
 
This rotational system applies both to decisions with regard to monetary policy, as well as 
supervisory decisions. These arrangements have been designed for the ECB’s monetary policies. 
Yet, these are not necessarily the best voting arrangements for decisions on supervisory 
matters. Changing the rules would, however, be most difficult as it would require a Treaty 
change. 
Mediation Panel 
Legislators have taken into account the possibility that difference of opinion may arise 
between the Governing Council and the Supervisory Board. A specific procedure has been 
foreseen in case the Governing Council would block a decision that was proposed by the 
Supervisory Board. In that case, a national supervisor can appeal to the Mediation Panel. The 
Mediation Panel is mainly meant to solve disagreements on the impact of a decision on 
monetary policy. Nonetheless, it can also be consulted in case of other types of disagreement. 
This panel comprises a member of each SSM-country, either the governor of the national 
central bank or a representative of the national supervisor. Each member of the Mediation 
Panel has one vote and decisions are made by simple majority. All SSM-countries thus have a 
vote in the Mediation Panel, resulting in a composition that is more similar to the Supervisory 
Board than to the Governing Council. As a result, it is rather probable that the Mediation Panel 
would object to a decision by the Governing Council if that decision does not correspond with 
the decision made in the Supervisory Board. 
However, the role of the Mediation Panel is limited, as its decisions are in no way binding on 
the Governing Council. Nonetheless, a decision of the Mediation Panel is likely to have moral 
authority, making it difficult for the Governing Council not to take it into account.
31
 
                                                 
29 Article 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank (Decision ECB/2004/2). 
30 See Article 10.2 of Protocol No 4 of the TFEU on the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB. The ECB 
Statutes foresee a rotational system from the moment the eurozone has more than 15 members. 
The Statutes, however, also provide the possibility to postpone the rule until the eurozone has more 
than 18 members. This possibility was used by the ECB in 2008 (Decision ECB/2008/29). The Treaty 
does not allow for an exception once the eurozone has more than 18 members. 
31 Article 18(3b) of the Council Agreement. 
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Panel of Review 
A Panel of Review is created for the contestation of a decision by the Governing Council by 
private and legal persons, including banks. The Panel is to allow for a timely challenging of 
supervisory decisions, which are to limit the lengthy procedures before the European Court of 
Justice. Procedures before the European Court of Justice are, of course, still possible. The 
Panel comprises five members, who must not be employed by the ECB or a national supervisor.  
Any person to whom a supervisory decision is addressed may appeal to the Panel, as well as any 
person who is directly and individually affected by such a decision. The Panel subsequently 
casts a verdict on the matter at hand. It takes its decision by a majority vote (i.e. at least 
three members approve the verdict). After this verdict, the Supervisory Board re-examines the 
case. It subsequently submits a new draft decision to the Governing Council, for which the 
normal decision-making procedure applies. As for the Mediation Panel, the verdict of the Panel 
of Review does not commit the ECB’s decision-making bodies beyond the moral authority of the 
Panel. 
4.2. Non-eurozone membership of the SSM 
While the Treaty provides for a viable base for making the ECB the supervisor for the eurozone, 
it has proven legally more difficult to include non-eurozone countries in the ECB’s supervisory 
scope. In a nutshell, the Treaty stipulates that non-eurozone countries are not allowed to vote 
in the final decision-making body of the ECB (see supra), nor are they bound by decisions made 
by the ECB.
32
 As a consequence, non-eurozone Member States cannot become full members of 
the Banking Union, in the sense of having the same rights and obligations as eurozone 
countries.  
Due to these limits, a specific membership had to be foreseen for non-eurozone Member 
States, referred to as a “close cooperation agreement”. Most importantly, entering into such 
an agreement is voluntary. If a non-eurozone country decides to do so, it needs to respect 
three important conditions that also apply to eurozone countries: a) all its banks need to be 
part of the SSM; b) the Member State needs to fully cooperate in sharing information with the 
SSM, and c) the country needs to abide by ECB decisions in supervisory matters. 
Even when a non-eurozone country has entered into an agreement, the ECB is not allowed to 
address its decision directly to the banks of that country. The ECB is to address its decisions to 
the national supervisor, who in turn needs to ensure that the bank applies the decisions. This is 
a distinct difference with banks that are based in the eurozone, which can receive direct 
instructions from the ECB. 
Due to both the voluntary nature of the close cooperation agreement and the ECB’s inability to 
enforce supervisory decisions outside the eurozone, the agreement can be terminated quite 
easily. Such a termination could typically be the result of a disagreement on a supervisory 
decision. Both the ECB and the participating non-eurozone country can decide on such 
termination: 
 Termination of the agreement by the ECB. Two options exist. Firstly, the ECB issues a 
warning to a country stating that the country does not respect one of the three 
                                                 
32 Article 139(1)b of TFEU. 
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conditions mentioned above (all banks involved, information sharing, and abiding by 
ECB decisions). If the country does not take sufficient action after such a warning, the 
ECB can end the agreement. A second option applies in case the Governing Council 
objects to a decision by the Supervisory Board. The non-eurozone country can then 
notify the Governing Council that it objects to the decision. If the Governing Council 
nonetheless sticks to its decision, the non-eurozone country can choose not to apply the 
supervisory decision. The Governing Council is then to evaluate the impact of the 
country’s non-implementation and could decide to suspend or terminate the 
agreement. 
 Termination by a non-eurozone country. Terminating the partnership agreement is 
easier for the non-eurozone country than it is for the ECB. A non-eurozone SSM-country 
can end the agreement whenever it disagrees with a draft decision by the Supervisory 
Board. If a country has been part of the SSM for more than 3 years, it can even choose 
to end the partnership without the need for any specific motivation. However, if a 
country has terminated the partnership agreement, it cannot enter into a new close 
cooperation for a period of three years.
33
 The latter should deter a country from 
stopping the close cooperation in the spur of the moment. Using these provisions could 
even delay a Member States’ entry into the eurozone, as the eurozone would surely not 
accept a country to enter the Monetary Union without being part of the SSM. 
The flexible close cooperation agreement was inspired by the desire to include willing non-
eurozone countries in the SSM. The Council Agreement is much more accommodating than the 
original Commission Proposal. It could even be asked whether the SSM-membership for non-
eurozone countries is not too flexible. A arrangement that is too flexible can have a negative 
impact on the ECB’s supervisory authority in non-eurozone countries, as these countries could 
at any point threaten not to apply a supervisory decision, or leave the SSM altogether. As part 
of the discussions on the final legislative text, the European Parliament is likely to insist on 
having a more binding form of non-eurozone SSM membership. 
4.3. Separation monetary and supervisory tasks 
A major concern of some Member States, notably Germany, was the risk that endowing the ECB 
with supervisory responsibilities might have a negative effect on the ECB’s monetary policy. 
Two arguments support this concern. Firstly, supervisory and monetary responsibilities might 
conflict with each other. For example, providing liquidity to distressed banks may stabilise the 
financial system, but it can also lead to higher inflation.
34
 As the ECB becomes a bank 
supervisor, it might take such supervisory considerations into account in its monetary policy, to 
the detriment of the latter. Secondly, mistakes in supervision can have a reputational impact 
on the ECB in general, and thus also on its monetary reputation. Mistakes in bank supervision 
seem unavoidable, as this often requires a judgment call by the decision-makers. With clear 
monetary policy objectives in place, monetary policy decisions are less prone to obvious policy 
                                                 
33 Article 6 of the Council Agreement. 
34 DE GREGORIO, J., 2010, Recent challenges of inflation targeting. In: Perspectives on inflation 
targeting, financial stability and the global crisis, BIS Papers No 51. 
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mistakes. There is thus a risk of reputational damage in supervisory responsibilities spreading 
to monetary policy.
35
 
To prevent supervisory decisions influencing monetary policy and vice versa, legislators aimed 
to fully separate monetary and supervisory decision-making. In the words of the German 
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, the EU should create a “Chinese wall” between the two 
policies.
36
 This has only partly been achieved. 
The Council Agreement states that the ECB is to separate its supervisory tasks from its 
monetary tasks, notably including a separation of the staff involved in the different tasks. The 
separation is also reflected in decision-making, where supervisory decisions are essentially 
taken by the Supervisory Board that has no role to play in ECB other policies (see supra). The 
Governing Council, for its part, has to organise separate meetings discussing either bank 
supervision or monetary policy. 
Despite these measures, there is no full separation between supervision and monetary policies, 
either on the national or the European level. In practice, bank supervision is carried out by the 
national central bank in a majority of the Member States– i.e. the same body that deals with 
monetary policy.
37
 On the national level, the working-level separation between the supervision 
and monetary policy in the central banks is not as strict it is the case at the European level. 
Requiring the national central banks of SSM-countries to introduce such separation could be 
considered. 
While there may be a separation between supervisory and monetary tasks in the ECB’s 
administration, this is not the case when it comes to decision-making. First of all, decisions are 
elaborated in the Supervisory Council, which is mainly composed of national supervisors. As 
there is a less strict separation at the national level, this influences decision-making in the 
Supervisory Council as well. Furthermore, the Governing Council deals with decisions 
concerning both bank supervision and monetary policy. Despite the obligation to organise 
separate meetings for the two policies, it is simply impossible for the members of the 
Governing Council to strictly avoid concerns regarding one matter influencing the other. 
Both on the national and the European level there are hence no Chinese walls between bank 
supervision and monetary policy. Under a pessimistic view, the separation between the 
monetary and supervisory functions can be perceived as just as faulty as the separation 
                                                 
35 The risk of reputational damage was illustrated by the problems in the Italian bank Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena. As the President of the ECB Mario Draghi was Governor of the Bank of Italy when 
some of the questionable operations took place, his track record came under fire. The criticism 
would have been even more extensive if the ECB would have been the responsible supervisor at the 
time. See for example, DIXON, H., 2013, Mario Draghi’s poisoned banking chalice. Reuters, Opinion, 
4 February. 
36 SCHÄUBLE, W., 2012, How to protect EU taxpayers against bank failures. Financial Times, 
Commentary, 30 August. 
37 In 11 out of 17 eurozone countries, bank supervision is carried out by the central bank. In the 
non-eurozone countries willing to join the SSM, this is 5 out of the 9. 
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between the compartments on the Titanic.
38
 Yet, it is unsure whether perfect separation is 
truly desirable. 
Cross-cutting issues (literally in case of the Titanic, metaphorically for the SSM) are of 
importance. In this respect, the main problem for the ECB’s monetary policy during the current 
bank crisis is precisely the lack of detailed information on the financial health of the banking 
system. Allowing for information flows between the monetary and the supervisory arm of the 
ECB would largely overcome this issue.
39
 Instead of aiming for a full-blown separation, it thus 
seems more important to be clear on when supervisory decisions are influenced by monetary 
policy concerns, or vice versa. 
4.4. Accountability 
The creation of the SSM implies a shift in the accountability of the ECB towards national 
governments and European institutions. When the ECB was created, much attention was given 
to its independence. This was to reassure Germany that the ECB would be able to perform its 
monetary policy in a similar vein as the German Bundesbank. As a result of the insistence on 
independence, the reporting requirements and general accountability of the ECB were limited. 
The ECB became one of the most independent central banks in the world.
40
 
Yet, bank supervisory tasks call for a substantial level of accountability, which is to a certain 
extent in contrast to the accountability that is required for monetary policy. This requires a 
change in the ECB’s openness about its policy decisions, as compared to former practices. 
Supervisory decision-making is more prone to subjective elements than monetary policy. While 
supervision should also be carried out independently, the supervisor needs to be open on the 
decisions it makes and the reasons behind those decisions.
41
 Accountability does not necessarily 
have to result in a less independent supervisor, as long as accountability does not mask an 
attempt to steer supervisory decisions. Of course, there is a fine line between holding the ECB 
accountable and attempting to steer its decisions.
42
 
The accountability of the ECB is to be ensured by different instruments. A somewhat indirect 
form of accountability consists of an annual report by the ECB on its supervisory operations. 
The ECB is to present this report to other European institutions.
43
 While the SSM Regulation 
does not require so, the ECB will most likely make this report public – It seems difficult to 
prevent wider circulation of such a report. 
Beyond the annual report, a more direct form of accountability consists of interaction between 
the ECB and other public bodies. Such accountability mainly concerns the European level. The 
                                                 
38 For a pessimistic view, see: VAUBEL, R., 2012, Economic and legal problems of European banking 
supervision. Europolis. 
39 Beck, T. and Gros, D., 2012, Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision: Coordination instead of 
separation. CEPS, Policy Brief No 286. 
40 CHALMERS, D, DAVIES, G & MONTI, G, 2010, European Union Law. Cambridge University Press, p. 
732.  
41 See principle 2 of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2012, Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision. 
42 Marc QUINTYN, M., RAMIREZ, S. & TAYLOR, M., 2007, The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the 
Independence and Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors. IMF Working Paper, WP/07/25. 
43 Namely: the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Eurogroup. 
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chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB is obliged to appear at least annually in the European 
Parliament and the Council.
44
 These institutions can request an ad hoc hearing of the chair 
when this is felt to be necessary. The ECB is furthermore to reply to oral and written questions 
from the Parliament and the SSM-countries. The European Parliament will try to increase the 
scope of these accountability arrangements, for example by obtaining the right to “summon” 
the ECB as opposed to the right to “request a hearing”. 
To a lesser extent, the ECB is also accountable to national parliaments. As is the case for the 
European Parliament, national parliaments can ask the ECB oral and written questions. The ECB 
is, however, not obliged to respond to the questions – although it would be politically difficult 
for the ECB not to do so. National Parliaments can also ask the ECB to appear in their 
parliament, but only concerning a bank based in that Member State. Furthermore, the ECB is, 
again, not obliged to accept the invitation. Individual Member States can still provide for 
accountability arrangements with their national supervisors. Yet, as these national supervisors 
do not have final supervisory responsibility in SSM supervision, such accountability will become 
less relevant. 
The accountability arrangements of the SSM lie essentially at the European level, which 
matches lifting bank supervision to that level. This is in line with the December 2012 Report of 
the European Council President that states that “democratic control and accountability should 
occur at the level at which the decisions are taken”.45 This principle is, of course, most 
sensible. However, Member States should realise that this reduces the role of their national 
parliaments in the policies concerned. National Parliaments can still be involved in the 
accountability of bank supervision in future, but this will inevitably be a more indirect form of 
accountability than when bank supervision was a national competence. This issue is likely to 
arise for other transfers of competences. The need for accountability, indeed, demands 
additional efforts to increase the European Institutions’ legitimacy towards its citizens. 
Without proper action, the lack of legitimacy could prevent the transfers of competences to 
the EU-level, even if this would be felt necessary for other reasons (such as the completion of 
the EMU). 
5. Relation SSM with European and International Supervisory Bodies 
The creation of the SSM has repercussions beyond the borders of its participating countries. It 
will, first of all, modify the role of cross-border supervisory cooperation in the EU (5.1). 
Furthermore, as a majority of the Member States will join the SSM, this step in differentiated 
European integration is bound to have an impact on the EU-wide bodies (5.2). The SSM can 
even have an influence on the functioning of the international supervisors (5.3). 
5.1. Cross-border supervisory colleges 
About cross-border supervisory colleges 
A cross-border supervisory college groups the different supervisors of the main countries in 
which a given bank operates. Each supervisory college thus deals with a specific cross-border 
                                                 
44 This meeting would only include the SSM-countries. 
45 VAN ROMPUY, H., 2012, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. 26 June 2012. 
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bank. In the EU, supervisory colleges are established for all banks with subsidiaries or 
significant branches in other Member States.
46
 Internationally, colleges are to be set up for all 
major cross-border financial institutions.
47
 While the creation of these colleges is a step 
forward in cross-border coordination, they remain non-binding. National supervisors thus do not 
have to take into account the result of discussions in the supervisory colleges. 
Impact of the SSM 
The impact the creation of the SSM has on supervisory colleges depends on whether the college 
deals with a bank that operates in the SSM-countries only, or with a bank that operates beyond 
the borders of the SSM. 
For banks operating inside the SSM only, supervisory colleges have lost much of their added 
value. For matters that are considered “essential” supervisory tasks (see 3.2.), the ECB 
becomes the supervisor with final authority. While there will still be coordination among 
national supervisors on these matters, this will take place inside the SSM. In case of 
disagreement, the ECB can enforce its decisions. This will substantially improve cross-border 
coordination. For “non-essential” supervisory tasks, the supervisory colleges remain useful (the 
ECB has no supervisory authority with regard to these tasks). However, taking into account the 
limited competences that are left at the national level, it seems that the supervisory colleges 
for SSM-banks will become much less relevant.
48
 It might be more useful to coordinate the 
“non-essential” supervisory tasks within the framework of the SSM-structure as well, even 
though the ECB would not have final authority on those tasks. 
For banks that operate beyond the borders of the SSM, not much should change, in principle. 
The ECB will gain a seat at the table of the supervisory colleges, but this will not be to the 
detriment of the role played by the national SSM-supervisors in the colleges. However, as the 
ECB can decide on the supervisory practices in the SSM, it is to be expected that the SSM-
countries will defend a common point of view in the supervisory colleges. Especially for those 
banks that operate mostly within the SSM and in only a few other countries, this is likely to 
change the dynamics in supervisory meetings. Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, discussions in 
the supervisory colleges will remain non-binding on the supervisors. Even if the SSM-countries 
should dominate a meeting, the other supervisors remain free to adopt a different supervisory 
approach. 
5.2. EU-level bodies 
Two EU-level bodies have a substantial role to play in bank supervision. On the one hand, the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) deals with supervision on the level of individual banks (i.e. 
micro-prudential supervision). On the other hand, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
deals with overall risks in the financial sector (i.e. macro-prudential supervision). Both are 
impacted by the creation of the SSM, but the EBA’s operations are undoubtedly influenced the 
most. For this reason, its functioning will be altered. 
                                                 
46 Article 131a of Directive 2006/48/EC of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the 
business of credit institutions [recast], OJ L 48, 30.3.2010, pp.1-252. 
47 This is a result of the G-20 Washington Summit of 14–15 November 2008. 
48 WYMEERSCH, E., 2012, The European Banking Union, a First Analysis. Ghent University, Financial 
Law Institute, Working Paper 2012-07. 
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5.2.1. European Banking Authority 
About the EBA 
The EBA was created in 2010 in the aftermath of the financial crisis and groups the bank 
supervisors of all the Member States. It replaced an existing committee that proved 
insufficiently effective either to prevent or handle the crisis.
49
 It was thought necessary to 
move away from the consensus-based decision-making that was in place before, and which had 
clearly hampered effective decisions.
50
 As no pan-Member State supervisory integration was 
foreseen when the EBA was created, the EBA’s competences and decision-making were 
designed with national supervisors in mind. 
The EBA has a variety of tasks. Some of these are limited in scope and essentially aim to 
improve supervisory coordination in a non-binding manner. Yet, in other fields, the tasks of the 
EBA are more substantial. The EBA has three main tasks:  
1. Working towards a single rulebook for the financial sector. This implies harmonising 
rules that apply to the banks operating in the EU. The main instrument for this purpose 
is setting technical standards that further detail EU legislation. 
2. Ensuring respect of the EU legislation. The EBA can counteract a breach of Union law, 
or settle disagreements between supervisors on the application of the rules. 
3. Prepare for and deal with crisis situations. This involves contingency planning and 
stress tests, as well as powers in crisis situations to impose decisions
51
 on supervisors 
and banks. The EBA can also suspend certain financial activities. 
Decisions in the EBA are taken by the national supervisors of the Member States. Before the 
creation of the SSM, the EBA was to take normal decisions by simple majority. Qualified 
majority applied for the EBA’s more comprehensive competences (see Table 1).52 With the 
creation of the SSM, these voting arrangements were put into question. 
Impact of the SSM 
Member States that preferred to stay outside of the SSM feared that it would lead to them 
having less say in the EBA, or even no say at all. Such a fear is based on the possibility that the 
SSM-countries would vote as a single entity in the EBA. If this were the case, the SSM would 
indeed dominate decision-making. 
Even if the SSM would consist only of the eurozone countries, it would hold a simple majority in 
the EBA, and would thus be able to push through any such decisions. For votes by qualified 
majority, the situation is more complex. Until November 2014, the eurozone as a whole will 
not have a qualified majority of votes, but it would possess a blocking minority. The SSM would 
therefore be able to block any decision in the EBA. In November 2014, qualified majority rules 
                                                 
49 The EBA replaces the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), established by 
Commission Decision 2004/5/EC of 5 November 2003. 
50 Decisions by the CEBS were to be made by unanimity as much as possible. Only when a consensus 
was not feasible could decisions -by way of exception- be taken by a qualified majority. 
51 Such a decision may, however, not have an impact on (“impinge’’ in the wording of the 
Regulation) the financial responsibilities of the Member States. 
52 VERHELST, S., 2011, Renewed Financial Supervision in Europe – Final or transitory? Egmont Paper 
44. 
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will change. As a result, the eurozone as a whole is set to have a qualified majority in decision-
making. A transition period will nonetheless apply until 2017, during which a Member State can 
ask for the previous rules to be used.
53
 
While the voting rights of the SSM-countries as a whole are significant in the EBA, the fears of 
non-SSM countries are in part exaggerated. Neither the eurozone nor the SSM-countries will 
vote as single entities in the EBA. Voting rights will still lie with the national supervisor and the 
ECB will not even gain the right to vote. While the Commission’s proposal stated that the SSM 
countries should coordinate their voting in the EBA, this requirement has been dropped in the 
Council Agreement. 
Yet, though this is not a legal obligation, it is clear that the creation of the SSM calls for more 
coordination among its members with regard to some decisions that are made in the EBA. In 
certain fields prior coordination and convergence in voting seem needed. If a disagreement 
arises between the ECB and a non-SSM country on supervisory practices, it seems natural that 
the SSM-countries would adopt the ECB’s stance on the matter. The same goes for declaring an 
emergency situation and suspending financial activities. 
To accommodate for the fears of non-SSM countries, additional safeguards in the EBA’s 
decision-making have been included in the Council Agreement of December 2012. The final 
voting rules in the EBA will undoubtedly differ from the Council Agreement on some points. As 
the European Parliament has an equal say on the Regulation concerning the EBA, it will be able 
to have more influence on the matter than is the case for the general SSM Regulation. 
Nonetheless, the basic modifications to the EBA are already clear. 
The major novelty is the double majority that is necessary for the approval of several types of 
decisions. This double majority implies that a decision needs to be approved by both a majority 
of SSM-countries and a majority of non-SSM countries. A decision cannot be adopted if one of 
these majorities is lacking. The Council has proposed to introduce the double majority for 
three types of decisions: 
 Matters that were previously approved by qualified majority. Here, the double majority 
comes in addition to the existing qualified majority requirement. 
 Decisions concerning a breach of EU law and the settlement of disagreements between 
supervisors. In addition to the double majority rule, a panel procedure has been 
introduced. This panel needs to draft a preliminary decision. The panel would be 
composed of the chair of the EBA and six national supervisors.
54
 The panel’s decision 
can subsequently be adopted by a double simple majority. 
 Decision-making on crisis management would switch from a simple majority to a double 
simple majority. 
                                                 
53 From November 2014 onwards, a qualified majority consists of 55% of Member States and 65% of 
the EU population. See Article 16(4)TEU. All eurozone countries combined represent 60% of the 
Member States and 66% of the population. As a block, they will thus acquire a qualified majority. 
Given the narrow majority, changes to the membership of the eurozone or the EU can tilt the 
balance in a certain direction. 
54 Before, a preliminary panel was used only exceptionally, i.e. for the binding settlement of 
disagreements with regard to consolidated supervision, which concerns the overall supervision of a 
banking group. 
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The remainder of the decisions, which involves mostly low-key decisions, would still be 
adopted by a simple majority. Table 1 provides an overview of the former majority rules and 
the modified rules as proposed by the Council. 
Table 1: Revised Decision-making in the EBA 
Matter Old majority rule 
New majority rule proposed by 
the Council 
Technical standards 
QMV QMV & double simple majority 
Guidelines and 
recommendations 
Financial provisions 
Reconsideration of a decision to 
ban or restrict a financial 
activity 
Breach of EU Law Simple majority 
Panel proposal, adopted by 
double simple majority Settlement of disagreements 
Simple majority, panel proposal 
for the binding settlement of 
disagreements on consolidated 
supervision* 
Crisis management Simple majority Double simple majority 
Other decisions Simple majority Simple majority 
 Notes:  
 Double simple majority: simple majority of both (a) countries in the SSM and (b) countries outside 
_the SSM. 
 * Panel proposal, adopted by simple majority, unless blocking minority. 
 
These voting rules allow the EBA to function normally for as long as a substantial number of 
non-eurozone countries stay out of the SSM. However, if only a handful of Member States would 
stay out of the SSM, the system would become hardly functional. The few non-eurozone 
countries would gain a disproportionate say in the EBA decision-making, as they would easily be 
able to block decisions. For these reasons, the voting mechanisms in the EBA are to be revised 
when four or fewer Member States are not members of the SSM. 
If the SSM-countries would block progress that is wanted by the members of the SSM, it might 
bring SSM-countries to carry out some of the EBA’s functions inside the SSM itself. This could 
notably be the case for the move towards a single rulebook (see 6.4). In this sense, by 
potentially pushing SSM-countries to approve their own single rulebook, the double majority 
requirement might actually have a negative impact on the Single Market, instead of preserving 
it. This risk has been acknowledged by the Council, as the majority rules are to be a prime 
element in a future review of the EBA. 
Besides these precise changes to the voting rules, the Council proposes a general, non-binding 
provision that is to be added to the EBA’s legal framework. This provision states that, in its 
decision-making, “[the] EBA shall strive for consensus when taking its decisions”.55 This implies 
                                                 
55 Article 44(4a) of the Council Agreement on the EBA. 
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a subtle, but manifest return to consensus decision-making, despite the fact that this was seen 
as one of the weak points of the former EU-level committee. It appears that Member States are 
again –unfortunately– heading in that direction. 
5.2.2. European Systemic Risk Board 
About the ESRB 
Like the EBA, the European Systemic Risk Board was created as a response to the financial 
crisis. Preceding the crisis, supervisors had focused mostly on the health of individual financial 
institutions. Much less attention was paid to the overall stability of the financial system. This 
led to an underestimation of the risks in the financial sector as a whole. As a response to this 
failure, the focus on the overall stability (“macro-prudential supervision”) was stepped up 
noticeably around the world. At EU-level, the ESRB is responsible for such supervision. 
The essential task of the ESRB is to supervise the financial system in order to detect potential 
risks that can affect the financial system and the real economy. When such a risk is detected, 
the ESRB can emit warnings and recommendations to the Member States and other EU bodies. 
The ESRB, however, lacks the competence to make decisions that are binding on others, as the 
Member States and EU bodies are not obliged to act upon the warnings and recommendations 
issued by the ESRB.  
In its present configuration, the ESRB is a rather bloated body. In an EU with 28 Member States, 
the ESRB has 67 members of which 38 have voting rights. Voting members comprise 
representatives of all Member States, the President and Vice-President of the ECB and other 
representatives of EU bodies.
56
 The ordinary voting rule in the ESRB is voting by simple 
majority. A 2/3rds majority is needed only when a recommendation or warning is to be made 
public.  
Impact of the SSM 
At the time of writing, in March 2013, no formal changes to the tasks or membership of the 
ERSB are foreseen. This is despite the fact that the ECB will obtain major competences and 
expertise in the field of macro-prudential supervision in the SSM. 
The SSM-countries and the ECB are set to vote independently from each other. While this will 
not de jure be the case, it is possible that SSM-countries will in practice frequently take the 
same stance in the ESRB, due to the ECB’s expertise. If this is the case, the position of the SSM-
countries is likely to be the determining factor in the ESRB’s decisions.57 If only eurozone 
members are part of the SSM, the SSM will be just short of a simple majority – it would have 19 
out of the 38 votes. Yet, it would be able to stop any decisions being adopted. Whether the 
SSM-countries will have a majority in the future will depend on evolutions in EU and SSM 
memberships. 
                                                 
56 The other voting members from EU bodies are: a member of the European Commission; the 
Chairpersons of the three European Supervisory Authorities; the Chair and two Vice-Chairs of the 
ESRB’s Advisory Scientific Committee and the Chair of ESRB’s the Advisory Technical Committee. 
57 BABIS, V., FERRAN, E., 2013, The European Single Supervisory Mechanism. Working Paper, 
University of Cambridge. 
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Despite the apparent threat of a caucus by the SSM that determines the decisions in the ESRB, 
this does not seem a genuine risk. First of all, national supervisors and the ECB will not always 
vote in a similar fashion. There continues to be an element of discretionary judgement in 
assessing the scale of a macro-prudential risk, which will lead to diverging voting behaviour. 
Secondly, the ESRB’s decisions are non-binding. Even if the SSM would impose its view on the 
others in the ESRB, this would not have any major consequences. 
While changes to the ERSB are currently not foreseen, it is likely that the functioning of the 
ESRB will be altered as part of a review that is to be carried out by mid-December 2013.
58
 This 
review could involve the role of the ECB in the ESRB as well as the balance of power between 
the SSM and non-SSM countries in the decision-making process. 
5.3. International bodies 
As was the case inside the EU, the financial crisis resulted in changes in international bodies 
that deal with financial supervision. Besides the supervisory colleges for individual banks that 
were discussed above, macro-prudential supervision has gained importance. 
In this respect, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
are to conduct joint Early Warning Exercises on the build-up of macroeconomic and financial 
risks.
59
 The creation of the SSM is another argument in favour of joint eurozone representation 
in the IMF. Yet, it is most unlikely to be the decisive factor in such a reform. 
In the FSB, things might be different. The FSB makes it decisions by unanimity. Its extensive 
membership (64 members covering 21 countries and several international bodies), complicates 
decision-making, rendering tough decisions unlikely.
60
 Despite the creation of the SSM, no 
changes in FSB membership are foreseen. From the viewpoint of decision-making in the FSB, 
this is regrettable. 
The SSM-countries should reconsider their membership in the FSB. The ECB is already a member 
of the FSB. It therefore makes little sense for the FSB to include national financial supervisors 
of SSM-countries, as is currently the case for France, Germany and Italy. An even more 
comprehensive reform would be to let the ECB represent not only the national supervisors, but 
also the national central banks of the eurozone. This would reduce the SSM representation in 
the FSB by 8, creating room for the ESRB to join the FSB. Such a move would both improve the 
FSB’s ability to spot financial risks in Europe and facilitate its decision-making, rendering 
supervision by the FSB more effective. 
  
                                                 
58 Article 20 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-
prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, OJ L 
331, 15.12.2010. 
59 G-20, 2009, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System. London. 
60 LOMBARDI, D., 2011, The Governance of the Financial Stability Board. Brookings, Global Economy 
& Development, Issues Paper. 
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6. The Other Necessary Pillars of the Banking Union 
Setting up the SSM is the first important step in the direction of a European Banking Union. 
More is needed, however, for a well-functioning Banking Union. Besides the SSM, the Banking 
Union is to be based on 4 other essential pillars. These pillars are: 1) short-term crisis 
management; 2) arrangements for long-term crisis management; 3) a form of European deposit 
insurance; and 4) harmonised rules for banks. Each of these additional pillars is discussed in 
this chapter. 
When the EU adopts the legislative package on the SSM, it will set in motion a dynamic that 
will inevitably have to lead to significant steps in these other fields of the Banking Union. 
Without sufficient progress on the other pillars, the Banking Union would be incomplete and 
therefore unstable. A half-finished European Banking Union risks being worse than the existing 
national approach.
61
 This would inevitably lead to a future crisis, which would then have to be 
mended by completing the Banking Union. A clear parallel can be drawn with the Economic and 
Monetary Union, where a weak Economic Union was not able to match the strong Monetary 
Union. This resulted in the sovereign crisis that is ravaging the eurozone. The question thus 
seems not to be if the EU will put in place the elements mentioned below, but when.
62
 
6.1. Short-term banking problems and direct recapitalisation 
While the SSM can help in preventing or limiting future crises, it is no solution to the already 
existing problems in the banking sector. Certain instruments have already been put in place to 
deal with these short-term problems, such as national public bailouts and the ECB’s lending 
facilities. Yet, these instruments seem to have hit their limits. Due to the “vicious link” 
between banking and sovereign debt problems, national public support is not always the 
appropriate solution. Once a country’s solvency has come into question, the promise of 
potential public support loses its credibility (see 1). In 2012, Spain fell victim to this problem. 
In June 2012, direct European recapitalisation was put forward by European leaders as an 
answer to the Spanish woes. Such direct recapitalisation was to mitigate the Spanish public 
fiscal burden, as the country would not have to carry the burden of rescuing its financial sector 
alone anymore.  In their statement, eurozone leaders declared that the direct recapitalisation 
is possible only “[w]hen an effective single supervisory mechanism is established“.63 Although 
the wording allows for multiple interpretations, it seems that direct recapitalisation will be 
possible only when the SSM is fully operational, i.e. in 2014. In the meantime, an operational 
framework for such direct recapitalisation will have to be agreed upon. The eurozone has 
committed to reaching such an agreement in the first half of 2013. 
It is useful to note that direct recapitalisation is to serve as a last-resort option, only to be 
used when the country risks insolvency. This is different from the common crisis management 
that is suggested for dealing with future crises, when a European approach could be pursued 
from the moment problems arise (see infra). 
                                                 
61 WYPLOSZ, C., 2012, Banking union as a crisis-management tool. In: BECK, T. (ed.), Banking Union 
for Europe: Risks and Challenges. Centre for Economic and Policy Research. 
62 VERHELST, S., 2012, Banking Union: Are the EMU design mistakes being repeated? Egmont, 
European Policy Brief 12. 
63 Euro Area Summit Statement, 29 June 2012. 
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Direct recapitalisation by the EU is not without risks for the eurozone countries. Losses due to 
such operations could be shouldered by all eurozone countries, not only the country in which 
the bank is located. This had led the most creditworthy countries in the eurozone to push for 
three limits to direct recapitalisation. 
Firstly, they seek to exclude problems that have arisen in the past.
64
 These problems are 
referred to as “legacy issues”. Such legacy issues are, to a large extent, due to past policies in 
the countries in question. Certain other eurozone countries do not feel that they should carry 
the burden attached to the problems. Common liability for legacy issues is therefore likely to 
be limited, and the Member State in which a bank is located will remain accountable for a 
substantial part, or even the total amount, of potential losses. Member States with problems in 
their banks try to introduce a difference between, on the one hand, “legacy issues” in a narrow 
sense and “retrospective loans” on the other. In their view, “legacy issues” refer to banks that 
have already been closed down, while “retrospective loans” could be used for banks that are 
still operating. 
Beyond limiting legacy issues, a second limit sought by the most creditworthy countries 
concerns the general risk-sharing in direct recapitalisation operations. A compromise will most 
likely be reached when the country in which the bank is located will carry a more substantial 
part of possible losses than the other eurozone countries. 
Creditor countries fear that these operations could quickly deplete the ESM’s lending capacity, 
requiring them to put in additional funds. Therefore, the final limit that is set to be introduced 
is a limit on the amount that the ESM can spend on direct recapitalisations. This will entail a 
pre-determined cap on direct recapitalisations. 
The exact scope of these three limits will depend on the outcome of the negotiations. While 
the limits all make sense, they also entail risks. Putting too strong a limit on direct 
recapitalisations will hollow out their purpose. The likely consequence of limits that are too 
strict would be that the link between banking and sovereign problems would not be broken 
after all. This would be most detrimental to Ireland and Spain, where this link is preventing a 
recovery from the crisis. 
6.2. Future crisis management 
Even with the best of bank supervisors, crises in the banking sector will occur. Most Member 
States did not have a well-elaborated crisis management strategy when the financial crisis hit 
Europe. This is a partial cause of the substantial public resources that were needed to respond 
to the financial crisis. The EU therefore needs to be better prepared for dealing with future 
crises. Discussions on future crisis management will basically have to answer three questions: 
which rules are needed, who is responsible and who pays? 
Which crisis management rules? The need for a common legal framework 
In order to better withstand turbulence in the financial sector, crisis management provisions 
have to be improved. After many deferments, the Commission finally published a proposal on 
                                                 
64 See notably the Joint Statement issued by the Ministers of Finance of Germany, the Netherlands 
and Finland, 25 September 2012.  
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harmonised crisis management rules in June 2012.
65
 The European Council has committed itself 
to reaching an agreement in the first half of 2013. 
If adopted, the crisis management rules would apply to all EU Member States. The overarching 
aim of the proposal is to allow banks to fail with minimal influence on financial stability and 
without bailouts by public authorities. To achieve this, three sets of crisis management tools 
would be introduced, each aimed at a different stage of crisis management: 
 Preparatory planning for crisis situations. Such planning is to occur in normal times, so 
as to be ready for potential problems. Preparatory planning essentially centres on 
drawing up recovery and resolution plans for banks (so-called living wills) and making 
sure the plans can be applied during a crisis. 
 Early intervention powers. Supervisors are to be able to intervene from the moment 
problems are detected in a bank. Under the Commission’s proposal, supervisors would 
be able to require the bank to implement its recovery plan, convene a shareholders’ 
meeting to decide on actions and even replace (part of) the management of a bank. 
 Bank resolution. When a bank’s problems reach a point when there is no realistic 
prospect of recovery, a resolution authority would be endowed with extensive powers. 
The authority would be able to break up and/or sell a bank without the consent of its 
shareholders. The resolution authority would furthermore be able to impose losses on 
the bank’s shareholders (by reducing the value of shares) and “bail in” creditors (by 
reducing the value of their claims on the bank
66
). 
Which level is to be responsible for crisis management? The need for a European 
resolution authority 
Agreeing on how crisis management should take place is not enough. It is crucial to determine 
which level is to carry out these tasks. Traditionally, this has been a national responsibility. 
Yet, as supervision is lifted to the European level, the same should be done for crisis 
management.
67
 In line with the expression “you break it, you own it”, the same level of 
government should deal with bank supervision and the consequences of failed supervision. If 
this is not the case, disagreements are bound to arise during crises, which will only make 
matters worse. 
In December 2012 European leaders committed to creating a European Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM), though staying vague about what this SRM would entail. The fact that they 
refrained from committing to creating a European Resolution Authority is not a positive sign.
68
 
                                                 
65 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2012, Proposal for a Directive establishing a framework for the recovery 
and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 
77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 
2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, COM/2012/280, 6 June.  
66 This can take the form of a reduction in the creditor’s claim or a conversion of the claim into 
equity (e.g. shares). 
67 BOFINGER, P., BUCH, C. et al., 2012, Stable Architecture for Europe – Need for Action in 
Germany. German Council of Economic Experts, Annual Report. 
68 A draft version of the December 2012 Conclusions of the European Council made reference to the 
need to create a European Resolution Authority. Yet, this wording was toned down in the final 
version. 
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While national authorities can be involved, it is important to create a body at the European 
level with final authority on the matter – as is the case for the SSM. 
Setting up a resolution authority at the European level will, however, have to take into account 
the EU’s legal limits. It will notably be difficult to set up a separate EU body, as case law limits 
the powers that can be delegated to an executive EU agency.
69
 Nonetheless, certain legal 
options exist, notably: the enhanced cooperation procedure, Article 352 TFEU
70
 or a new inter-
governmental agreement.
71
 
Who pays for crisis management? The need for a European backstop 
Managing a bank crisis has fiscal costs. Deciding on who bears these is a sensitive matter. As 
mentioned above, the Commission proposed rules that allow the bank’s shareholders and 
creditors to bear losses when needed. This is a useful step, but it will not always be sufficient. 
Other means of paying for crisis management therefore have to be put in place. 
A first element is the creation of a resolution fund that can be used to finance crisis 
management. Such a fund is to be financed by contributions from the banking sector. As crisis 
management should take place on a European level, it is preferable to create a single fund that 
covers all SSM-countries, rather than putting different national funds in place. 
Even the accumulation of the instruments above (shareholders, creditors and a resolution fund) 
is not certain to provide adequate financial resources for dealing with a large-scale banking 
crisis. When there is a large need for financial means to deal with a crisis, turning to public 
(i.e. the taxpayer’s) resources is inevitable. Such a possible recourse to public funding is 
referred to as a public backstop. 
In line with the need for a European crisis manager, such a backstop should ideally also be 
created at the European level. If not, discussions on spending will hamper any effective use of 
the funding. Designing a public backstop on the European level will, however, not be a simple 
matter, as the EU does not have the ability to levy taxes in the way that national governments 
do. Different options are available to finance crisis management at the European level, 
including: a) an ex-ante agreement on burden-sharing among the SSM-countries, b) ESM-lending 
and c) ex-post European taxation to finance crisis management. A combination of certain of 
these options seems most likely. If the ESM were to be used as a public backstop for the SSM, 
its relation with the non-eurozone SSM countries will have to be redefined.
72
 Proposals on the 
subject are most likely to be integrated in the proposal on the SRM. 
 
                                                 
69 See the Meroni doctrine: Joined Cases 9-56 and 10-56 Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v 
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. 
70 Article 352 TFEU allows the EU to adopt measures to obtain a Treaty objective for which the 
Treaty itself has not explicitly endowed the EU with the needed powers. Such measures need to be 
adopted by unanimity in the Council and with the consent of the European Parliament. 
71 BABIS, V., FERRAN, E., 2013, The European Single Supervisory Mechanism. Working Paper, 
University of Cambridge. 
72 IMF, 2012, A Banking Union for the Euro Area: Technical background notes. 13 February. And 
PISANI-FERRY, J., SAPIR A. (et al.), 2012, What kind of European banking union? Bruegel, Policy 
Contribution 2012/12. 
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6.3. Deposit guarantees 
Deposit guarantees serve to protect depositors. If a financial institution fails, this guarantee is 
to ensure depositors that their savings can be redeemed up to a predetermined amount. In the 
EU, deposit guarantees are provided by each Member State separately – with certain common 
minimum requirements set at EU level.
73
 
In July 2010, the Commission proposed to go a step further than those minimum requirements 
by fully harmonising the rules on deposit guarantees. In addition, it proposed the possibility for 
one national deposit guarantee scheme to lend to another national scheme when needed. A 
single European Deposit Guarantee Scheme, however, was not proposed.
74
 
It is doubtful whether national level deposit guarantees can be compatible with a European 
Banking Union. If a government’s financial health is put into question, depositors will question 
the government’s ability to guarantee deposits. This can lead to a “national bank run”, in 
which depositors move their savings away from the banks in that country.
75
 National deposit 
guarantees thus would not break the negative feedback loop between sovereign and bank 
crises. 
For this reason, a SSM-wide form of deposit guarantees is often deemed necessary, although 
less pressing than common crisis management.
76
 Yet, a European deposit guarantee is a 
delicate political subject, given the fact that it can potentially involve large transfers from one 
Member State to another. As a result of the lack of urgency and the political resistance, no 
concrete official proposals on the matter have been made. 
Avoiding discussions on the matter is, however, a hazardous strategy. There is a genuine risk 
that there will not be sufficient willingness to create a SSM-wide deposit guarantee once the 
peak of the ongoing crisis is behind us, which would result in a flawed Banking Union. 
6.4. Harmonised rules for banks 
While the EU level already defines national rules for the financial sector to a large extent, 
substantial differences persist. Such differences in national regulation hamper effective 
supervision at the European level. More harmonised rules therefore need to be put in place to 
facilitate the task of the SSM and hence improve the quality of its supervision. In EU jargon, 
such harmonisation takes the form of a single rulebook. 
National policy actions after the Liikanen Report on Bank Structural Reform illustrate the 
difficulties of achieving common rules. The main recommendation of the Report was to 
                                                 
73 See Directive 94/19/EC [consolidated version] 
74 European commission, Proposal for a Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes [Recast], 12 July 
2010, COM(2010)368 final 
75 Like the evolutions of national savings that we have seen in Spain and Greece. See Brookings, p.7 
76 CONSTÂNCIO, V., 2013, Towards the Banking Union, Speech by the Vice-President of the ECB at 
the 2nd FIN-FSA Conference on EU Regulation and Supervision “Banking and Supervision under 
Transformation” organised by the Financial Supervisory Authority, Helsinki, 12 February; and PISANI-
FERRY, J. & WOLFF, G., 2012, The Fiscal Implications of a Banking Union. Bruegel, Policy Brief 
2012/02, September. 
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separate investment and retail banking to a certain extent (“ring-fencing”).77 The two main 
countries in the SSM, France and Germany, both pursued their own, separate approach in 
response to these recommendations, even though the SSM requires a common approach. 
A major step in the harmonisation of financial sector legislation was the agreement on the 
Capital Requirements IV Package (CRD IV) in March 2013.
78
 This package mainly translates the 
Basel III agreement into European law, although it also contains rules on other matters such as 
bankers’ bonuses. 
In other fields, regulatory convergence is needed as well. Here, the EBA has a role to play. 
However, harmonised rules are more important for the SSM-countries than for the countries 
outside the SSM. For the EU as a whole, the single rulebook essentially serves to improve the 
single market in financial services. For the SSM, the single rulebook is needed for the stability 
of the banking system. 
Tensions can arise between the SSM-countries and the other Member States. A tendency could 
develop in the SSM to agree on rules on which the EBA was not able to reach a (prompt) 
agreement. The double majority rules in the EBA actually push the SSM-countries to develop 
their own rules (see 5.2). Such closer integration with regard to financial sector legislation in 
the SSM alone does not need to affect the EU single market, as long as non-SSM countries’ 
branches can continue to operate in the SSM and setting up subsidiaries in the SSM does not 
become too cumbersome for banks in non-SSM countries. The compatibility between the EU-
wide single market and closer integration in the SSM will certainly be put to the test, however.  
7. The Roadmap towards the SSM and the Banking Union 
Just as Rome wasn’t built in a day, it will take time to get the Banking Union up and running. 
The EU is to act on several different fronts to achieve a full-fledged Banking Union (see 6.). 
During their December Summit, European leaders have committed themselves to a most 
ambitious roadmap to advance the Banking Union. While the steps towards a Banking Union are 
intertwined, the nature of the roadmap for the SSM is different from that of the other pillars of 
the Banking Union. For the SSM, the essential task will be to take practical measures in order 
to make the project work. For the other Banking Union pillars, the legislative framework is still 
far from finalised. In those fields, the EU’s task is mainly to reach a sufficiently ambitious set 
of agreements. Figure 3 provides an overview of the EU’s planned roadmap towards the 
Banking Union. 
7.1. The SSM 
A final agreement on the SSM between the European Parliament and the Council is to be a first 
milestone in the Banking Union. An agreement was originally to be reached before March 2013, 
but this has proved to be impossible. It seems likely that an agreement will be concluded 
sometime in the first half of 2013. 
                                                 
77 High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector, 2012, Final Report “ 
Liikanen Report”. October. 
78 See COUNCIL OF THE EU, 2013, Press release. 3227th Council meeting, Economic and Financial 
Affairs, 5 March. 
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The SSM is to reach full speed 12 months after the legislative text enters into force. Under the 
current planning, the SSM would consequently become fully operational when the ECB obtains 
final supervisory responsibilities in the first half of 2014. Before that date, the ECB is to build 
up its supervisory capabilities, recruit qualified staff and establish working relations with the 
national supervisors. This will be an arduous task.
79
 
The ECB can already start carrying out supervisory tasks before it obtains actual final 
responsibilities. It will thus be able to monitor the banking sector, but cannot intervene in the 
banking sector. Under the Council Agreement on the SSM, the only exception to this rule is for 
a bank to be directly recapitalised by the ESM. For these banks, the ECB would already be able 
to take up supervisory responsibilities before the full entry into force of the SSM. However, this 
stipulation conflicts with the planned timing for direct recapitalisation, which is foreseen only 
for when the SSM is fully established (see infra). 
Figure 3: The Roadmap toward Europe’s Banking Union 
 
7.2. The other pillars in the Banking Union 
Besides an agreement on the SSM, legislators are to find common ground on several other 
aspects of the Banking Union in the first half of 2013. This includes agreements on the 
procedure for direct bank recapitalisation for short-term crisis management, longer-term crisis 
management rules and harmonised rules on deposit guarantees. This provides for a packed 
legislative agenda. Beyond these legislative proceedings, the European supervisors are to 
progress in creating a single rulebook, which will be a continual project for the EBA.  
Once the Council and the European Parliament will have reached a conclusion on long-term 
crisis management rules, the Commission is to make a proposal on a Single Resolution 
Mechanism. This was planned for the first half of 2013, but this timing is unlikely to be met. 
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After the first six months of 2013, the first half of 2014 is the second crucial phase for the 
Banking Union. Once the SSM is operational, direct recapitalisation of banks will become 
possible. The EU is also to reach an agreement on the Single Resolution Mechanism before the 
European elections of June 2014. 
7.3. A roadmap that is both overly ambitious and incomplete 
The European calendar for putting in place the Banking Union is, in all likelihood, too ambitious 
in terms of timing. Past experiences have shown that reaching an agreement between the 
Parliament and the Council takes longer than foreseen. In addition, the European and national 
(notably German) election calendars are likely to interfere with the legislative work. Politicians 
will be less willing to compromise, or simply lack the time due to campaigning. 
Besides the currently overly ambitious calendar, a major issue has not yet been included in the 
Banking Union’s planning: a European deposit insurance. Some form of European deposit 
insurance will be needed in the long term to complete the Banking Union. It is therefore likely 
(and desirable) that the next Commission will table proposals on the matter. 
As the EU’s agenda is both overly ambitious and incomplete, it is to be expected that only a 
partial Banking Union will be put in place at first. The mismatch between the level of 
supervision and the level of crisis management can be partly overcome by allowing for the 
direct European recapitalisation of banks. However, this is only a temporary solution (as direct 
recapitalisation is a last-resort instrument, limited in size and only available for eurozone 
countries). A Single Resolution Mechanism would therefore have to be put in place shortly after 
the SSM becomes operational. Progress on harmonising rules will also be of importance. While 
this will undoubtedly not have resulted in a single rulebook before the SSM is operational, more 
harmonisation would allow for a less perilous journey towards European control over the 
banking sector.    
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Conclusion 
In June 2012, eurozone leaders took some of their boldest decisions so far. By providing for the 
possibility of direct European recapitalisation of banks and the creation of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism, the eurozone made progress in tackling two interlinked crises: the 
sovereign debt crisis and the banking crisis. 
Overall, the Council Agreement reached in December 2012 presents a satisfactory first step 
towards the SSM’s creation and the Banking Union in general. While the final discussions 
between the Council and the European Parliament will undoubtedly alter some aspects of the 
SSM, its basic design will remain unaltered. The SSM has the potential to improve the quality of 
supervision and restore confidence in the short-term. 
On the positive side, Member States have agreed on a SSM that covers nearly all banks 
operating in the participating countries. They thus withstood the temptation of creating a 
partial SSM that would have covered only the largest banks. Another positive element of the 
compromise is the large role that is offered to non-eurozone countries in the SSM, within the 
scope of what is legally feasible. Furthermore, without setbacks, the relation between the SSM-
countries and the other Member States will not pose significant problems in the near future. 
The creation of the SSM, however, raises several challenges as well. Whether the SSM will 
indeed prove to be a better supervisor than the previous supervisory structures remains unsure. 
It will prove quite a task for the ECB to take up its supervisory role. The ECB needs to quickly 
develop supervisory competences and will have to exert its final supervisory authority on 
national institutions, even though the latter often have a long tradition in supervision. Also, 
practical arrangements are needed with regard to the tasks that national bank supervisors 
carry out on behalf of the ECB. The ECB will have to be able to monitor national supervisors 
and spot potential problems. Crucially, the ECB will have to dare to take away the supervisory 
functions of a national supervisor when necessary. Furthermore, the coordination between 
bank supervision on the European level and national supervision of the rest of the financial 
sector could be a source of tension. 
Non-eurozone countries’ membership of the SSM will remain delicate. In several ways, they will 
not be full members of the SSM. While the concern about a lack of voice has been taken into 
account, the fact remains that non-eurozone countries do not have a say in the final decision-
making body. An arguably bigger problem is the fact that the membership of non-eurozone 
countries remains rather noncommittal. At any given point, these countries will be able to 
leave the SSM. This could make effective supervision in those countries more difficult, as the 
possible exit of the non-eurozone country from the SSM will always be an option/threat. 
Treaty provisions limit not only the role played by non-eurozone countries in decision-making; 
they also implicate smaller eurozone countries, which in the future will lose permanent voting 
rights in the ECB’s final decision-making body. While such arrangements may be appropriate for 
monetary policy, this is not necessarily the case for supervision. 
The lack of full non-eurozone membership and the issue of voting rights are not the only fields 
in which the Treaty has rendered the task of designing the SSM more difficult. This is also the 
case for the delegation of supervisory tasks to the ECB and the required unanimity among 
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Member States that is needed for approving and modifying the SSM legislation (with, in 
addition, little say for the European Parliament). 
The Treaty’s limitations have resulted in a sub-optimal design of the SSM. Despite these issues, 
the SSM can function within the existing Treaty. It is not worth changing the Treaty merely for 
the sake of the SSM. However, if, in the future, the Treaty is changed for other reasons, EU 
legislators would be wise to revise the Treaty provisions that impede a better design of the 
Banking Union. 
Apart from it being a good or bad evolution, the SSM marks a clear additional step in the EU’s 
multi-speed integration. It strengthens the differentiation between a) the eurozone core, b) 
the non-eurozone tier that is willing to participate in closer integration, and c) the outer tier of 
Member States that prefer to stay out of closer integration. The main concern here is the SSM’s 
impact on the single market. With proper care, the SSM can be compatible with the single 
market. Nonetheless, frictions seem unavoidable. Countries outside the SSM have gained the 
power to block EU-wide decisions on the harmonisation of rules for the banking sector. It is to 
be expected that the SSM-countries will agree on rules that only apply to them. This will 
encourage cross-border banking activities in the SSM, but could make it more cumbersome for 
banks from other Member States to be active inside the SSM-countries. 
The EU needs to realise the unavoidable consequences of creating the SSM. The SSM is only a 
first step in setting up a Banking Union. Four other pillars still need to be decided upon, 
namely: short-term crisis management, long-term crisis management provisions, some form of 
a European deposit guarantee and, finally, harmonised banking rules. These issues are 
politically most sensitive and there is not yet a common vision on the shape of these pillars. It 
is most likely that the EU’s ambitious roadmap will not be achieved. The risk is very real that 
Member States will try to retain powers on the national level and limit potential fiscal transfers 
between them. The lack of willingness to discuss a European deposit guarantee illustrates the 
national reticence. Yet, a lack of thorough decisions would result in a dysfunctional Banking 
Union. A new crisis in the banking sector would be inevitable. The major question that remains 
is therefore whether a genuine Banking Union will be achieved in the coming years, or whether 
it will require a new major crisis to put in place all its necessary elements. 
Perseverance is needed now, so as not to repeat the problems linked to the imbalances in 
design of the Economic and Monetary Union. When the challenges and difficulties in advancing 
the Banking Union prove substantial, the EU and its Member States should keep in mind the 
ultimate goal: a safe banking sector that is able to contribute to the prosperity of European 
citizens. The importance of this goal should convince decision-makers to push ahead and 
refrain from stopping half-way. With the creation of the SSM, the first decisive step towards 
the Banking Union is about to be taken. Now, it is up to the EU to do the rest. 
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